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Abstrat
In this paper we desribe how to build a trusted reliable dis-
tributed servie aross administrative domains in a peer-to-
peer network. The appliation we use to motivate our work
is a publi key time stamping servie alled Prokopius. The
servie provides a seure, veriable but distributable stable
arhive that maintains time stamped snapshots of publi keys
over time. This in turn allows lients to verify time stamped
douments or ertiates that rely on formerly trusted pub-
li keys that are no longer in servie or where the signer no
longer exists. We nd that suh a servie an time stamp
the snapshots of publi keys in a network of 148 nodes at the
granularity of a ouple of days, even in the worst ase where
an adversary auses the maximal amount of damage allowable
within our fault model.
Keywords: Digital Time Stamping, Distributed Trust,
Byzantine Agreement, Digital Signatures, Peer-to-peer
Arhival
1 Introdution
Reent eorts in peer-to-peer networking [CSWH00,
DFM00, WRC00, Gnu, KBC
+
00℄ have demonstrated the
feasibility of providing very large-sale distributed ser-
vies. Dierent peer-to-peer networks provide various
ombinations of many valuable traits, suh as anonymity,
data permanene, eient queries, authentiation, and
the ability to inlude partiipants from many dierent
organizations and ountries with no single entral au-
thority. This last trait is of partiular importane to
appliations that oer reliability guarantees. As an ex-
ample, the resistane of a doument to ensorship or our
belief in the integrity of a doument's ontent may be
more ahievable for politial reasons when the network
supporting the doument storage and retrieval is om-
posed of independent nodes in many ountries with the
nodes able to ome to a majority agreement about the
existene or ontents of the doument.
Yet without a single administrative authority or soure
of trust information about nodes, it remains diult in
these networks to build suh servies when the external
information required for validating query results is no
longer available. This ould our, for instane, if the
validity of the doument resulting from a query relies on
a digital signature whose signing or veriation key is no
longer valid or available.
In this paper, we explore how to build long-lived re-
liable trusted servies in a very loosely-oupled, dis-
tributed environment. In partiular, we look at how to
enable partiipating servers from diverse, independent
administrative domains to implement a ommunal ser-
vie that an be onsidered as a trusted third party,
even if not all partiipating servers are trusted by every
user of this servie. We also desribe ways to preserve
the ontinuity of suh a servie aross membership or
network hanges over time as partiipants join, fail, or
prove themselves untrustworthy.
The appliation we use to motivate this eort is a dis-
tributed seure publi key time-stamping servie, alled
Prokopius. Prokopius builds a seure, veriable but dis-
tributable stable arhive that maintains time stamped
snapshots of publi keys over time. This in turn allows
lients to verify time stamped douments or ertiates
that rely on formerly trusted publi keys that are no
longer in servie. Suh funtionality is essential when
arhiving digitally signed douments whose validity is
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dependent on an expired signature, not only after the
signing key has hanged, but even after the signer is no
longer available.
While very useful, suh a servie would have to be
very thoroughly trusted. To our knowledge, only en-
tralized implementations of time stamping servies exist
today [Sur℄. We believe that distributing not only the
funtionality, but also the organizational administration
of suh a servie, an inrease its ability to address the
trust requirements of the diverse global digital ommu-
nity that the Internet has reated. Although we motivate
our work with Prokopius, the work is also valid for any
servie that requires the long-term arhival of authenti-
ated information.
We evaluate the agreement protools used in Prokopius
using a new simulator, alled Narses, that simulates
transport-layer ows, eliding individual paket informa-
tion. This is faster than paket-level simulators [FV99℄
for large-sale networks, while still apturing the inter-
dependenes of ommuniations. Our results show that
time stamping rounds on the order of a ouple of days are
entirely feasible in a network of 148 nodes, even where
an adversary auses the maximum amount of damage
possible within our fault model. Given the slow rate of
hange of publi key information, this is appropriate for
our appliation domain, although it may be too slow for
other appliations. While slower than a entralized ser-
vie, the distributed servie is more believable and more
survivable, aross both natural disasters and .om fail-
ures.
The overall ontributions of this paper are
• The design of a seure distributed publi key time
stamping servie that is survivable even aross a
omplete hange in servie provider membership
over time,
• A deployable implementation of protools for Byzan-
tine agreement aross dierent administrative do-
mains,
• The denition of ways in whih these protools an
be used in the fae of node membership hanges and
only loally managed trust relationships between
nodes,
• A simulator based on transport-layer ows eliding
individual paket information, and
• A performane evaluation of these protools in the
ontext of Prokopius.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Se-
tion 2 we desribe the urrent state of the art for time
stamping servies and for long-term arhival of signed
douments. In Setion 3 we go over the funtionality
of Prokopius in the larger ontext of time stamping ser-
vies on the Internet through a detailed walk-through.
In Setion 4 we desribe in more detail the atual tasks
performed by Prokopius, after listing expliitly the as-
sumptions we make. Setion 5 presents the omponent
protools we use as building bloks. In Setion 6 we de-
sribe the Narses ow-based simulator. In Setion 7 we
evaluate Prokopius based on the time required to exe-
ute its ore omponents, given the maximum damage
an adversary may ause. In Setions 8 and 9 we desribe
related and future work, respetively. We onlude in
Setion 10.
2 State of the art
In this setion we outline the relevant fats of time stamp-
ing and digital signatures, on whih the Prokopius system
is based. First we begin with a desription of how en-
tralized time stamping works. Then we briey list the
objetives of digital signatures, the impliations of their
limited lifespan, and how time stamping an fortify them
for long term storage.
2.1 Time stamping
Digital time stamping is a servie whose objetive is to
fortify douments in digital form with a ryptographi
guarantee of their minimum and maximum age, as well
as their integrity [HS91℄.
A Time Stamping Servie (TSS) aepts douments
from lients for time stamping. In response to a sub-
mitted doument, the TSS returns to the requester a
time stamp, whih is a ryptographi value derived from
the doument. The derivation of the value uses, among
other things, a ollision-resistant, one-way funtion; this
makes it intratable to nd a dierent, meaningful do-
ument that mathes the same time stamp as the original
doument. Consequently, given a valid time stamp, the
integrity of a doument an be proteted.
The time stamp also gives anyone who ares to verify
it a guarantee on the age of the doument. The atual
guarantee varies from servie to servie, and from time
stamping sheme to time stamping sheme. In its sim-
plest form, the time stamp ontains a time designation
(i.e., date and time), and guarantees that the doument
existed in this form at the time inluded in the time
stamp. In the most naïve implementation of this guar-
antee, the TSS merely signs the above quoted statement
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Figure 1: The time stamp for doument B is dependent on
the ontents of doument B and on the time stamp for dou-
ment A.
for every doument it time stamps; as long as everybody
trusts the TSS, suh signed statements are suient.
However, most pratial TSSes also oer their lients
guarantees of aountability. The TSS takes extra steps
to onvine its lients that it annot heat, i.e., it an-
not bak- or post-date douments surreptitiously. This
is aomplished using binary linking shemes [BdM91,
BLLV98℄. These shemes link douments together ryp-
tographially in direted graph strutures so that ars
in the graph follow the time ordering of the stamping
operations (i.e., if there is an ar from doument A to
doument B, then doument A was time stamped before
doument B). Linking shemes rely on ollision-resistant,
one-way funtions as well. In Figure 1, the time-stamp
for doument B is derived from doument A using suh a
funtion, and the linking struture is a singly linked list.
From the derivation, we an safely assume that the TSS
had possession of doument A when it time stamped do-
ument B; that is, doument A existed before doument
B was time stamped by the TSS. If, instead, the TSS did
not know A or its time stamp when it time stamped B,
then it must have been able to nd a doument A that
maps  along with doument B  to the time stamp of
B after the fat, whih is intratable given the assump-
tions about the omputation of time stamps and one-way,
ollision-resistant funtions.
Binary linking strutures reate preedene relation-
ships among douments  from doument A to dou-
ment B, in the example  but say nothing about the
absolute times at whih those douments existed. To
plae the reation of the time stamp of doument B at a
well-known point in time, one ould publish it in a popu-
lar newspaper. Then it is simple to argue that doument
A existed before the time of publiation of the newspaper
issue, whih plaes the doument in time. TSSes do ex-
atly that. First they link douments submitted roughly
at the same time in a onneted linking struture with a
single soure and a single sink vertex (i.e., a single vertex
tsinktsource
Document
Linking Structure
SinkSource
A
A
B
B
Figure 2: A binary linked struture grounded on well-known
times tsource and tsink. Sine every doument in the struture
ould only be time stamped after the value in the Soure was
determined, and the value in the Sink ould only be deter-
mined after all douments in the struture were time stamped,
the times of the Soure and Sink an plae the time stamp-
ing of all douments in the struture within the time interval
[tsource, tsink].
ti+1
ti
ti-1
Roundi+1Roundi
Figure 3: Two onseutive rounds. Round i ontains dou-
ments time stamped between times ti−1 and ti. Round i+ 1
ontains douments time stamped between times ti and ti+1.
All douments in round i predate (as far as time stamping
goes) all douments in round i + 1. The shaded value is not
grounded in a widely witnessed way, whereas the values for
time points ti−1 and ti+1 are.
with no inoming ars and a single vertex with no outgo-
ing ars). Then they ground the soure and sink ver-
ties to well-known points in time through publiation,
thereby plaing in time all intervening vertex-douments
(see Figure 2).
Douments partiipating in the same linking struture
make up a time stamping round (see Figure 3). Rounds
are linked to eah other through their soures and sinks.
In the gure, round i+1 uses as its soure the sink of its
immediately preeding round i. Therefore, all douments
in rounds i and earlier transitively preede douments in
rounds i+ 1 and later.
In pratie, there is a gap between the frequeny with
whih grounding ours and that with whih rounds
hange. This is beause the publiation of grounding val-
ues is fairly expensive and time onsuming  it involves
taking out an ad in a popular newspaper, or widely dis-
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tributing a write-one medium like a CD-ROM. On the
other hand, sine round duration determines the granu-
larity of time stamping, for most pratial appliations it
has to be kept relatively short. Typially, time stamping
rounds ome at the granularity of a seond, but ground-
ing ours only at the granularity of a week [Sur℄. Intra-
publiation soure/sink vertex values, i.e., the values that
do not get the wide, write-one distribution of the infre-
quent grounding values, are broadast by the TSS on-
line and are taken by the lients on faith. This is not
a major problem, sine grounding protets only against
the unlikely event that the TSS heats. This frequeny
disparity makes it possible for the TSS to heat, but only
between grounding value publiations, whih is a period
of a week or so. A maliious TSS ould post- or pre-date
a doument by a few hours, even a ouple of days, but
not by more than a week. In the example of Figure 3,
where the grounding value between rounds i and i + 1
is not published indisputably, a heating TSS ould pre-
date a doument time stamped at time ti ≤ t ≤ ti+1 to
look as if it were stamped at time ti−1 ≤ t
′ ≤ ti. How-
ever, it still annot make the doument look as if it were
stamped after ti+1 or before ti−1, sine it annot hange
the published grounding values before round i and after
round i + 1.
In the explanation above, we have desribed the time
stamp of a doument vaguely, as a ryptographi value
derived from the preeding douments. In fat, the time
stamp also ontains information that an be used to
prove that the doument ts within its linking struture.
Using this information, a verier an asertain that the
unforgeable link from the grounded soure to the dou-
ment to the grounded sink holds. The party who submit-
ted the doument to the TSS for time stamping an also
hek the validity of the linkage right after the assoiated
sink is made publi, to ensure that the TSS performed
its task orretly. In the example desribed in Figures 1
and 2, the proof of doument A's time stamp onsists
of doument B, given soure and sink values whose au-
thentiity is undisputed. A verier an derive A's time
stamp from the soure and A's ontents, then B's time
stamp from A's time stamp and B's ontents, and then
the sink from B's time stamp. If the time stamp for B
that the verier derives mathes the one he was given,
and if the derived sink value mathes the publi sink
value, the verier aepts the time stamp.
In pratie, the proof portion of a time stamp does
not really have to ontain the entire douments related
to the time stamped doument; in fat, it should not on-
tain entire douments, for privay and eieny reasons.
A proof need only ontain a ngerprint of those related
douments. A ngerprint of a doument is a rypto-
graphi digest of that doument, a value derived from it
using a one-way, ollision-resistant funtion, whih rep-
resents the doument seurely.
Several eient binary linking shemes have been pro-
posed. In the sheme employed in this paper, doument
digests and a Merkle tree [Mer80℄ struture are used, as
rst proposed within a time stamping setting by Benaloh
in [BdM91℄. The resulting time stamps have size propor-
tional to logn, where n is the number of douments in
a single linking struture. Details are presented in Se-
tion 5.6.
To perform the validity heks on doument integrity,
time plaement and the time stamp desribed above,
a verier must have available the doument itself, the
time stamp on that doument, and the grounding values
(sink and soure) immediately preeding and following
the round of that doument.
Although in most urrent time stamping systems, it is
assumed that a verier an obtain the grounding values
neessary for a time stamp veriation, it is not lear
how that an be done in the general distributed ase,
where multiple TSSes oexist, and no single one of them
is trusted by everyone. It is essential for a verier to
validate the grounding values themselves, to verify, that
is, that they are unique for the given TSS and the hosen
time periods. Otherwise, a maliious TSS or publisher
ould supply the verier with any grounding value that
would allow a faulty time stamp to be aepted. Loating
appropriate grounding values is a time stamping problem
by itself, and an be fairly omplex when time stamps
must persist for long periods of time (several deades)
and must onvine veriers in dierent loalities from
the original doument submitter. The survivability of
the seure, write-one medium used to publish grounding
values is of paramount importane for the longevity of a
time stamping system.
One of the goals of the work presented in this paper is
to address time stamp survivability. We extend the ba-
si time stamping model to allow time stamps to main-
tain their validity even after the TSS that issued them
goes out of business. Our extended time stamping model
is based on a globally-trusted time stamping infrastru-
ture, that does not require global trust of any one of its
basi omponents, and onsequently, does not require a
globally-trusted, immortal publisher of grounding values
for its wide-spread aeptane. We know of no other time
stamping servie that solves these two problems.
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2.2 The lifetime of digital signatures
In many ways, time stamps and digital signatures provide
similar servies. Time stamps authentiate a doument
temporally, by ertifying the time frame during whih a
doument was dated. Similarly, digital signatures au-
thentiate an endorsement on a doument, by ertifying
the identity of the party who endorsed that doument.
Briey, if entity A wants to sign doument D, A per-
forms an unforgeable but veriable omputation sk(.) on
the digest d = digest(D) of D, using key k. This ompu-
tation produes the signature σ = sSA(digest(D)); SA is
the seret signing key of A and it is intratable for any-
one who does not have that key to reate suh signatures
anew on any douments. Anyone in possession of A's
publi key PA an verify that a signed doument was in
fat signed by someone who knew SA.
Unfortunately, ryptographi keys have limited life-
times. Whether to limit the potential damage in ase
of seret key leakage, or to thwart the eorts of rypt-
analyti attaks, a signing key should be proatively dis-
arded and replaed by a fresh one either after it has
been used to sign a large number of douments, or after
it has been in use for a long period of time. Exat thresh-
olds on the signing volume or usage period of a signing
key vary, depending on the level of seurity required (see
[LV99℄ for an analytial approah to this problem). Fur-
thermore, when a key ompromise is expliitly deteted,
a new key should be reated immediately.
The ephemeral nature of signing keys makes the task of
arhiving signed douments omplex. Although A's do-
ument D might well be properly signed using SA when A
rst reates it, it is unlear how a verier an hek the
validity of the signature after A has hanged his signing
key to SA
′
. For instane, in the ase that D represents
a strenuous ontratual obligation undertaken by A (to
whih A testies, by signing D), if A an laim at any
time that his key has been ompromised, then he an
eetively repudiate his ontratual obligations outlined
in D. The onverse problem arises when A's ompro-
mised key is used to sign an unwanted statement D′.
How an A dislaim his apparent signing of D′ if there
is no telling whether the doument was signed before or
after the ompromise of SA?
For these reasons, time stamping an be essential. A
signed and then time stamped doument that predates
a hange of signing keys by the signer is arguably non-
repudiable. Although a thief of A's key an sign arbitrary
douments, she annot have them time stamped so as to
predate a time stamped report of key hange, as long as
the time stamping servie maintains its integrity.
It should be noted that if a key is ompromized and
used before it has been reported hanged, then its illiit
time stamped use is indistinguishable from its regular use
by its rightful owner. This is an inherent shortoming of
the urrently available digital signing failities. It an
only be ombatted through strit adherene to a proa-
tive key hange regime, whih an urtail the amount of
damage in whih a potential key ompromize an result,
and through the use of dierent keys for signing and for
seure ommuniation with the publi key infrastruture.
Though time stamping an strengthen signed dou-
ments to defy the inherently limited life of signing keys,
it does not sue by itself. A verier seeking to hek
the time stamped signature on doument D would have
to know whih partiular publi signing key to use. This
problem does not have a trivial solution. For example,
bundling the appropriate urrent publi key with the
signed doument before time stamping would not work.
To prove that the bundled publi key is the right one
(that is, the key assigned to the signer by the respon-
sible Certiation Authority), the signer would have to
inlude an identity ertiate CA, a statement equivalent
to Key PA belongs to entity A, signed by the Certia-
tion Authority. Then, the publi key of the Certiation
Authority would also have to be inluded in the pak-
age. Unfortunately, sine Certiation Authorities also
ome and go, and invariably identity ertiates for suh
authorities are self-signed, no ertiate for the Certi-
ation Authority is neessarily resistant to aging. In
essene, we would like a grounding identity ertiate
stating Key PCA belongs to entity CA at time t0 that
we ould trust forever, to bootstrap any signature veri-
ation proess.
In this paper, we propose a key arhival servie that
produes exatly suh boot-strapping identity erti-
ates. The servie also provides the properties of trust
ontinuity and potentially global trust, and it runs in
onjuntion with a distributed time stamping servie.
The following setion presents a funtional desription
of Prokopius.
3 Prokopius in perspetive
In this setion we introdue Prokopius, a basi infras-
truture servie that enables solutions to the longevity
and global aeptane problems faed by arhives of
signed douments as desribed above. We examine
Prokopius from the funtional standpoint, rst by giv-
ing an overview of the funtionality it provides, and then
by walking through an example of its use and role within
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Figure 4: Relationship among Time Stamping Servies
and Prokopius. Every time stamping servie partiipates in
Prokopius through its own Prokopius node. Some Prokopius
nodes might not belong to a Time Stamping Servie. The
shaded region depits the Prokopius system.
a larger arhival servie.
3.1 Funtional interfae
The objetive of the Prokopius system is to make wide-
area, long-term, seure arhives of signed douments pos-
sible through the use of time stamping and identity er-
tiate arhival.
Prokopius runs on a large set of nodes (we envision sys-
tems of the size of a few hundred nodes). All or most of
the partiipating nodes are operated by distint TSSes.
Those servies run almost exatly as urrent, traditional
TSSes do, independently of other Prokopius nodes. How-
ever, instead of publishing their grounding values to
a newspaper or other timed write-one medium, these
time stamping servies use as their publiation medium
the peer-to-peer arhival storage network that they par-
tiipate in, through their Prokopius nodes. In a sense,
TSSes form a wathdog federation that regulates how
the write-one publiation medium operates, thereby in-
reasing the aountability of eah partiipant (see Fig-
ure 4).
The rst basi funtion of Prokopius is to time stamp
grounding values for dierent TSSes. In that respet,
Prokopius ats as a TSS for TSSes, assoiating a time
stamp with the grounding values that dierent lient
TSSes submit to it. The funtionality of Prokopius is
split into two basi ategories:
Publiation A lient TSS submits a grounding value for
time stamping. When the round is over, Prokopius
alulates a time stamp on the lient's grounding
value and returns it to the lient.
Veriation A lient submits a grounding value along
with its time stamp for veriation. Prokopius looks
up the value and returns a yes/no answer along with
a proof for that answer.
Although Prokopius exports its time stamping servies
to all interested TSSes for generi use, it is also its own
lient so as to provide an identity ertiate time stamp-
ing and arhival servie. This servie is essential in safe-
guarding the longevity of signed, time stamped dou-
ments beyond the lifetime of the signing key used and of
the publi key infrastruture within whih the key was
assigned.
In its apaity as an arhive of time stamped identity
ertiates, Prokopius oers two types of funtionality:
Registration A lient submits a request for arhival
of its publi keys throughout time. In response,
Prokopius traks hanges in that lient's published
publi keys, and when it identies them, it arhives
previous versions of publi keys for that lient. The
lient may, at a later time, request that Prokopius
disontinue traking of its publi key.
Lookup A lient submits a request for the publi key of
a spei entity at a given time. Prokopius looks up
the key and returns it, if found, along with a proof
for its existene; if no suh key is found, Prokopius
returns a proof for the absene of a key for the re-
quested entity at the given time, whih means that
Prokopius was not traking that key at the given
time.
3.2 Example senarios
In this setion we desribe a set of simplied examples of
the use and operation of Prokopius in the larger setting
of servies in whih it funtions. First, we desribe the
time stamping of a doument and its subsequent veri-
ation without the help of the original time stamper.
Prokopius partiipates as a high-level TSS and as a se-
ure publiation medium.
Then, we explain how the proess hanges when
the doument submitted for time stamping is digitally
signed, and we want to be able subsequently also to ver-
ify the signature, not just the time stamp, on the do-
ument. Although Prokopius does not arhive digitally
signed douments itself, it arhives the signing keys that
an be used to verify signatures on douments arhived
through alternate means.
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Figure 5: The linking tree built by the TSS T after 13:45:53.
Leaves are labeled with the digest of the doument to whih
they orrespond. Intermediate nodes are labeled with the
result of a ollision-resistant, one-way hash funtion g(.) on
the label of the left hild node onatenated with the label of
the right hild node. The onatenation operation is indiated
by |. On the right edge of the gure, the proof of inlusion
Vd of doument D in the tree is illustrated graphially.
3.2.1 Time stamping a doument
The author A of doument D submits a digest of D,
d = digest(D) to the Time Stamping Servie T for time
stamping. Funtion digest(.) is a well-known, one-way,
ollision-resistant hash funtion, whih means that it is
intratable for anyone to nd a dierent doument D′,
suh that d = digest(D′). The author ould just as well
submit the entire doument D to the TSS. However, this
is not usually done, so as to avoid publiation of the
ontents of D, and beause D is likely to be muh longer
than its digest.
When T reeives d, it holds on to it until the end of
its urrent round. In this example, d arrives at T at
13:45:53 GMT on Marh 26 1998, and T has seond-long
rounds. After T has aumulated all doument digests
that arrived between 13:45:53 and 13:45:54  digests a,
b and c in addition to d  it builds a sorted Merkle hash
tree out of them, whih is the binary linking struture
used by T (see Figure 5). Finally, T returns to A the
proof Vd of d's inlusion in its linking struture for this
time, whih onsists of the values of d's sibling and the
siblings of its anestor nodes in the tree, as well as a bit
at eah level indiating whether d's anestor's position is
a left or right hild of its parent. The time stamp of d is
Vd = [c/R, e/R].
Armed with the time stamped doument D¯ = (D,Vd),
A an prove to G (for Gullible, sine he trusts T ) that
doument D was time stamped at 13:45:54 GMT, on
k=g(i|j)
v
3/18/1998
06:13:12
u
3/1/1998
16:08:12
x
3/30/1998
10:32:59
w
3/26/1998
13:45:54
i=g(u|v) j=g(w|x)
T's grounding value
Figure 6: The linking tree built by the TSS T after the end
of Marh 1998, ontaining all four round values of its four
non-empty rounds.
3/26/1998. All A has to do is give D¯ to G. G, who trusts
T , rst requests the round grounding value for 13:45:54
GMT on 3/26/1998 from T . In response, T sends bak
w (refer to Figure 5). Then G knows that if using the
proof Vd she an ompute the value for w, then the time
stamp must be valid. She proeeds to alulate w′ =
g(e|g(c|digest(D))), where | delares the onatenation
operation. As an be seen from the onstrution above,
w′ = w, and G is happy with the time stamp.
However, sine the time stamping servie T also wants
to be able to onvine those who don't trust it, as well
as those who do, that the time stamps it issues are or-
ret, it partiipates in Prokopius. In so doing, T uses
Prokopius as a seure, write-one publiation medium for
a small number of its grounding values. Every month, T
puts together all the round grounding values it has au-
mulated during the month into a linking struture, muh
like the one used above for digest linking. Figure 6 illus-
trates the Marh 1998 linking struture that T builds at
the end of the month. Marh was a fairly slow month,
so T had a total of only four rounds during whih it re-
eived digests for time stamping. A an request from T
an extension Vw of the proof of inlusion Vd that it re-
eived earlier, showing how doument D is linked to the
value k that T grounds with Prokopius. As an be seen
in Figure 6, Vw = [x/L, i/R].
Now T submits the grounding value k to Prokopius.
Prokopius returns to T a proof of inlusion Vk for this
grounding value in the global linking struture for Marh
1998, whose root is the widely published value l (Vk is
similar to Vw or Vd, so we omit its details; setion 5.6
has more information). Through this hierarhial sub-
mission to a larger, more widely trusted time stamping
entity, T an render its time stamps useful even to veri-
ers who do not trust it unonditionally. A an request
Vk from T and keep it along with the more spei inlu-
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sion proofs, forming a globally time stamped doument
Dˆ = (D,Vd, Vw, Vk). Now A an hand Dˆ to a verier
S (for Skepti) who trusts Prokopius but not T . S rst
requests a global round grounding value for Marh 1998
from Prokopius, and reeives in response value l. Then,
S alulates l′ from doument D and the suessive ap-
pliation of proofs Vd, Vw and Vk to D's digest. If l
′ = l,
then S an aept that D was time stamped some time in
Marh 1998. Dˆ an be veried regardless of the existene,
availability or ooperation of T , as long as Prokopius an
be reahed. If, furthermore, S trusts T , he an get the
benet of ner time plaement for doument D.
3.2.2 Time stamping a signed doument
In this setion we expand the time stamping senario
from the previous setion to handle signed douments. In
this senario, Prokopius is not only used as the high-level
TSS for normal TSSes, but also as an identity ertiate
arhive, used to verify time stamped, signed douments
that have been somehow arhived.
Using the tehniques desribed in Setions 2.2 and 2.1,
arhiving a signed doument amounts to time stamping
the signed doument at the time of signing (or at least,
before the signing key has hanged), and then arhiving
the assoiated ertiates along with the doument. The
time stamping portion of the operation is almost idential
to that desribed in Setion 3.2.1. The only dierene
is that instead of submitting the doument digest for
inlusion in a linking struture at the TSS, A submits his
signature σ on the doument. Sine a signature depends
on the digest of the doument it signs, it is at least as
good as the digest itself for building temporal dependene
graphs.
More speially, if A wants to sign doument D and
arhive it for posterity on Marh 26 1998, he rst signs
D using his signing key SA, to produe signature σ =
sSA(digest(D)). Then σ is subjeted to time stamping
at the TSS T , to produe Vσ, as was shown before in
Figure 5.
To make the signed doument self-suient in a long-
term arhive, A has to inlude with it his identity erti-
ate CA also. Reall that CA is a statement signed by the
Certiation Authority responsible for A, oially asso-
iating A with A's publi key SA. But then, CA itself is
a signed doument that must be arhived, and it needs
to be time stamped as well. In a pratial sheme the
ertiate CA would only be time stamped and stored
one for all douments signed by A in the period during
whih CA is valid. We demonstrate here how this is done
for ompleteness.
As for any other signed doument, CA onsists of its
data Z (the formal assoiation of the name A with the
key SA) and its signature σ
′ = sSCA(digest(Z)). σ
′
is now
submitted to a time stamping servie (for simpliity, we
assume it is also submitted to T , although it pratie it
is quite likely that a dierent TSS is used), yielding the
time stamp Vσ′ .
Unfortunately, the urrent master signature veria-
tion key SCA for the Certiate Authority also has to be
time stamped somehow. This is done with the help of
Prokopius. A CA that oers long-term ertiate valid-
ity to its lients signs up with Prokopius for key hange
traking. As part of that servie, Prokopius periodi-
ally heks the CA's urrent publi key. If the key has
hanged sine the last time it was heked, Prokopius
reords the time at whih this hange ourred and the
new value of the key. We desribe details of how this is
implemented in Setion 4.
To prepare the signed doument for arhival, A re-
quests from Prokopius a proof of inlusion VCA of the
CA's self-signed key ertiate CCA in its arhive. This
proof is similar to a time stamping proof of inlusion.
The time stamped, signed D is now fully represented
by D˙ = (D, σ, Vσ , CA, Vσ′ , CCA, VCA, Vw, Vk). Reall
from the previous setion that Vw and Vk are the proofs
that the TSS T has produed an appropriate globally-
grounding value inluding its urrent round, and has sub-
mitted that to Prokopius suessfully.
4 Design
In this setion we desribe the design of Prokopius.
We begin with a brief introdution to our two funda-
mental design goals, longevity and wide trust, that al-
low Prokopius to operate in settings where urrent time
stamping and arhival servies annot. We then break
down the basi tasks that Prokopius performs and ex-
plain eah in detail.
4.1 Design goals
The main idea behind Prokopius is to explore the
strengths of peer-to-peer distributed systems for build-
ing trusted servies. To provide the servie as outlined
in Setion 3.2, Prokopius must have the following two
properties:
Longevity Prokopius must have a high probability of
remaining operational for long, ontinuous time pe-
riods (on the order of several deades).
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Wide Trust Prokopius must be able to onvine at the
same time parties from dierent areas of the world,
with dierent aliations, business praties or loy-
alties  in short, parties who do not trust the same
entities  that it performs its tasks orretly.
We ahieve longevity by building Prokopius on a
loosely-oupled, deentralized distributed system. Suh
systems exhange omplexity for inreased reliability and
availability. If no system node is more signiant than
any other node, or equivalently, if the integrity of the
system relies equally on all partiipating nodes, then
any and all nodes are replaeable. This replaeability
eliminates the threat of single-point short- or long-term
failures. Consequently, we an laim informally that, no
matter how many partiipating nodes die, as long as new
nodes join at least as frequently as needed, then the sys-
tem will survive for longer periods than any single, well-
maintained node ould by itself. We make these desrip-
tions of the onditions under whih system longevity an
be ensured more spei in the following setions.
To make Prokopius widely trusted, we leverage teh-
niques for ahieving distributed onsensus in the fae of
maliious failures (also alled Byzantine failures). Dis-
tributed onsensus allows a set of distint nodes to agree
on a partiular ourse of ation, based on eah node's
individual opinion, even when a bounded fration of all
nodes are ating maliiously. In general, this is done by
requiring that a large fration of all nodes (usually, more
than two thirds of all nodes) agree with a partiular op-
eration, before that operation is arried out. Assuming
that the number of maliious nodes is relatively small
(usually, less than a third of all nodes), this tehnique
allows the overall system to mask out the ations of ma-
liious nodes, without even knowing who they are.
Distributed onsensus, as well as the related prob-
lems of distributed agreement and reliable broadast,
are fairly well-understood but are not in ommon use in
large-sale distributed systems beause of their inherent
high ost. Prokopius uses distributed onsensus teh-
niques only in operations that happen relatively infre-
quently (at the rate of one a week, or one a month).
Therefore, though still expensive, suh tehniques are af-
fordable in this ontext and allow Prokopius to meet its
wide trust requirement.
4.2 Basi tasks
Prokopius operates in rounds of duration τ , following
the paradigm of traditional TSSes. Sine Prokopius only
arhives identity ertiates, whih hange infrequently,
it need not be designed to reat to rapidly hanging in-
formation, as for example most distributed le systems
must do. Furthermore, Prokopius is not a general pur-
pose time stamping servie; it only ats as a seure, time
stamped publiation medium that general purpose time
stamping servies an use to publish their grounding val-
ues. Therefore, τ an be muh larger than the usual
duration of time stamping rounds.
To provide the servies outlined in Setion 3.2,
Prokopius must perform the following tasks at every
round:
• Trak identity ertiates for registered identities
and update the arhive with their time stamped
hanges (see Setion 4.4.2).
• Update its linking struture to inlude round values
that are newly submitted by partiipating TSSes,
as well as its own identity ertiate arhive round
value (see Setion 4.4.3).
• Assoiate a real time with the urrent round (see
Setion 4.4.6).
Furthermore, Prokopius must perform the following
tasks, for its own self-maintenane:
• Synhronize the hange of round among all partii-
pating nodes (see Setion 4.4.1).
• Update its distributed shared random number gen-
erator. This is used in the onsensus protools,
and is explained further in later setions (see Se-
tion 4.4.4).
• Approve or rejet the addition of new nodes in the
group, and ejet from its ranks nodes that are no
longer operational or that no longer enjoy the ol-
letive trust of the group (see Setion 4.4.5).
Figure 7 shows the high-level break down of eah
Prokopius round into tasks.
Individually, Prokopius nodes are harged with the re-
sponsibility of ontributing their independent view of two
types of information: rst, information that has one true
value, sometimes alled single soure information, and
seond, subjetive information that is more or less a mat-
ter of opinion or loal poliy, derived separately by eah
node, and that has no single, true value.
Prokopius nodes must be able to obtain two kinds of
single-soure information: the urrent real time, and the
latest identity ertiates as stored and disseminated by
the urrent Publi Key Infrastrutures. Though only a
single view of eah is onsidered orret at any one
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Figure 7: The basi tasks of Prokopius. Round-hange tasks
are grouped on the left, ordered from top to bottom to indi-
ate their order of exeution. The random number generator
update task ours before the membership update task, but
ompletes after it (see Setion 4.4.4 for details). Queries are
answered throughout the round hange proess.
time, nodes might have inonsistent, outdated views or
might maliiously try to misguide others with inorret
views. Using distributed agreement, Prokopius an mask
a bounded number of benign or maliious faults in the
dissemination of time and identity ertiates.
To obtain the urrent time, eah node ould use, for
instane, an atomi lok, a radio lok or a GPS lok.
Note that GPS is atually dependent on the U.S. mili-
tary, and thus may not be neessarily onsidered trust-
worthy by everyone in the world. The nodes do not syn-
hronize their loks with eah other, sine this would
violate the independene of the loks of distint nodes.
There is one kind of subjetive information that
Prokopius nodes must be able to form: assessments as to
whih other urrent or potential fellow Prokopius nodes
an be trusted to perform their tasks orretly. These
assessments are made based on system observations but
also on out-of-band exhanges among Prokopius nodes,
and have two goals. First, an assessment must evalu-
ate whether a node in question an meet the system's
minimum requirements, suh as proessing and onne-
tion speed, stability, data freshness, et. Seond, an as-
sessment must reet the belief of the assessor that the
target node will dutifully follow the rules of the system.
Simplistially, an administrator may form assessments
of another node by extrapolating the reputation of the
ompany operating that node. The rule would then be
that good, solid ompanies are likely to run good,
solid Prokopius nodes. By forming suh assessments,
Prokopius nodes eetively form their own wathdog or-
ganization. Global assessments, based on the assess-
ments of eah partiipant, are derived using a distributed
onsensus protool.
In the following setion, we desribe in detail the basi
assumptions we make for the orret operation of the
system.
4.3 System assumptions
The orretness of the design of Prokopius relies on sev-
eral basi assumptions. Some of these take the form of
minimum system requirements, while others plae re-
stritions on environmental parameters, suh as the max-
imum number of maliious nodes in the system at any
one time. We detail all assumptions here, but will also
justify eah as we go through the speiations of the
tasks that neessitate them.
Assumption 1 At any one time, no more than f
Prokopius nodes are faulty. If the number of all
Prokopius nodes at any one time is n, then n ≥ 3f + 1.
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Faulty nodes are those nodes that for whatever reason
do not follow the Prokopius protools or those nodes for
whih the system assumptions in this setion do not hold.
All other nodes are alled Corret.
This assumption is drawn from a fundamental theo-
retial result on distributed agreement [LSP82℄. Briey,
there is no protool that an solve the Byzantine Gen-
erals problem (a weaker version of the distributed agree-
ment and onsensus problems) if a third or more of all
nodes are faulty. It is ommon to assume this upper
bound on faulty nodes, and both the safety and the live-
ness of the agreement protools we use depend upon it.
However, it is lear that in exeptional ases involving
extremely powerful adversaries even suh a well-worn as-
sumption an be hard to maintain.
Assumption 2 Prokopius nodes fail or lie indepen-
dently.
This assumption means that the diulty with whih a
group of nodes an be made faulty through means exter-
nal to the group is proportional to the size of the group.
Similarly, a node beomes willingly faulty (i.e., without
external oerion) independently of other faulty nodes.
This assumption is important for the distributed on-
sensus and agreement protools, in onjuntion with As-
sumption 1. A threshold on the number of faulty nodes
is only meaningful if the number of faulty nodes reets
the amount of resoures needed to ause those nodes to
beome faulty. Otherwise, more faulty nodes are not
neessarily less probable than fewer.
This is the reason why nodes should be in dierent ad-
ministrative domains, ountries, or other independent or-
ganizations. Although omplex failure dependenes are
now being onsidered by the researh ommunity (e.g.
[Ca01, MR98℄), a satisfatory theory behind inferring
arbitrary failure dependenies has yet to be dened.
Assumption 3 The urrent Prokopius nodes, as well as
any other entity external to Prokopius, may only per-
form polynomially bounded, possibly probabilisti ompu-
tations.
The impliation of this assumption is that urrent ar-
guably sound ryptographi tehniques are safe to use.
For example, neither a Prokopius node, nor an exter-
nal adversary an, with non-negligible probability, nd a
ollision to a ollision-resistant hash funtion.
Assumption 4 Prokopius nodes and lients have a
well-known mehanism for authentiated ommuniation
amongst themselves.
This mehanism may rely on any partiular oexisting
infrastruture servie (e.g., Verisign, Entrust, DNSSEC),
or it may be ad ho, based on the web-of-trust paradigm
or even eeted through diret key exhange. This does
not mean that the nodes agree on whom they trust. It
simply means that orret nodes an retrieve an appro-
priate, up-to-date publi key for any other node in the
system.
Assumption 5 The eets of a fault on ommuni-
ations do not persist longer than the duration of a
Prokopius round.
For example, we assume that a node will eventually
reeive messages sent to it in the same round in whih
they were sent. If an adversary suessfully prevents all
opies of a message from reahing their destination dur-
ing an entire round, then we onsider the sender of that
message to be a faulty node, onstrained to the upper
limit f imposed in Assumption 1. Large-sale network
outages, partitions, and so forth may be aused by the
adversary, but they do not persist for the duration of a
protool round. Similarly, no denial of servie attak an
last longer than a round.
Beyond the onstraints desribed in this assumption,
the ommuniation network is ompletely unpreditable
and amenable to oerion by a maliious adversary. Mes-
sages may be arbitrarily dropped, reordered, dupliated,
et.
Our timing assumptions are similar in vein to
those made by other pratial Byzantine fault-tolerant
systems[CL00℄, although we feel they are easier to justify
in the less performane-driven ontext of our appliation.
Assumption 6 All orret nodes have loal time soures
that lie within τ/4 of the orret global time.
From this assumption it follows that no two orret
nodes' loal time soures dier by more than τ/2. This
assumption enodes onveniently the reasonable expeta-
tion that the loal time soures of well-maintained nodes
are highly unlikely to drift by more than a few minutes
from the orret time, let alone by days. Sine τ is on
the order of a ouple of days in our setting, imposing a
maximum drift of a few hours is not onstraining.
Sine we never really know exatly what the orret
global time is, but merely what our trusted loal time
soure reports, this assumption mandates that orret
loks remain lose to the orret global time. This is
neessary to support absolute time stamps. For example,
if ten years later we ask the system for a ertain identity
ertiate on the 26th of Marh in 2001, we do not want
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the query submitter and the system to have very dierent
ideas about what time the 26th of Marh 2001 atually
means. Solutions suh as the Timely Computing Base
proposal in [VCF00℄ might help render this assumption
pratial in all settings and for ner granularities.
Assumption 7 No more than f Prokopius nodes are re-
moved from or added into the system in one step.
This assumption is essential to ensure that Prokopius
nodes trust the history of the system. Speially, by re-
quiring that Prokopius membership hange slowly, we re-
quire that a newly installed Prokopius node group trusts
the group it sueeds. This is beause any two sues-
sive Prokopius groups share no fewer than n − f nodes,
that is no fewer than n− 2f orret nodes, whih means
that ommon nodes have ertainly more orret than
overtly faulty nodes (reall that n ≥ 3f + 1, and there-
fore, n− 2f ≥ f + 1).
4.4 Round Change
In this setion we present a step-by-step desription of
the tasks involved in hanging rounds (refer to Figure 7
for a high-level view of the operation). The rst three
steps (Setions 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.3) omplete the pre-
vious round. The last three steps (Setions 4.4.4, 4.4.5,
and 4.4.6) prepare and begin the next round.
4.4.1 Synhronization
In this step, the nodes ome to an agreement that it
is time to begin a new round. Eah node sets up a
round timer at the beginning of eah round. When
its loal round timer expires, a node broadasts a mes-
sage to all other Prokopius nodes, indiating it is ready
to onlude the urrent round i. The message has the
form <Round-Change,i>, and bears the signature of the
sender. Then, the node waits until n−2f suh broadasts
from individual fellow-members, inluding itself, are re-
eived. When a node has reeived n − 2f it marks the
time S on its loal lok, and then proeeds to the re-
maining steps of the round hange.
A node starts listening for Round-Change broadasts
before its timer expires, to ath broadasts from nodes
with faster loks. In fat, immediately after a round
hange has ompleted, a node begins listening for the
synhronization that signies the end of the new round.
Consequently, a node might atually reeive n− 2f syn-
hronization messages for the urrent round before its
own timer has expired. In that ase, the node ignores its
own timer and proeeds as if its timer had expired, i.e.,
it marks the loal time and moves on to the next step.
Beause of assumptions 1 and 6, we know that at least
the n− f orret nodes will send out round-hange mes-
sages, within τ/4 of the orret expiration of the urrent
round. We also know that no more than f of those mes-
sages an be dropped or delayed beyond the end of the
urrent round. Therefore, at least n− 2f orret round-
hange messages will arrive at eah Prokopius node, sig-
nifying that a majority of all orret nodes are ready to
proeed.
4.4.2 Certiate arhive update
One a round hange has begun, Prokopius nodes go
through their loal view of the identity ertiate arhive
and update it with reent hanges. Two types of hanges
are reorded in this step. First, nodes agree on any
newly arrived registrations or deregistrations of identi-
ties. Seond, Prokopius heks for new versions of iden-
tity ertiates for the identities urrently being traked.
Any found updates are inorporated into the ertiate
arhive. Both of these subtasks are heked aross the
entire system for onsisteny, before being ommitted.
We now desribe in detail eah of the two subtasks.
During a Prokopius round, lients may send some or all
of the Prokopius nodes identity registrations or deregis-
trations. An identity registration is a signed reord of the
form <Register-Identity, [Identity-Name℄>, and
signies the intention of the holder of [Identity-Name℄
to subjet his identity ertiates to traking by
Prokopius. Similarly, the holder of an identity may send
Prokopius nodes a signed deregistration reord of the
form <Deregister-Identity, [Identity-Name℄>, sig-
nifying that it no longer wishes to have his identity er-
tiates traked.
Prokopius nodes store the registration and deregistra-
tion messages they reeive after they have heked the
assoiated signatures and validity. For registrations, the
signature is heked using the veriation key urrently
published by the assoiated publi key infrastruture.
For deregistrations, the signature is heked using the
veriation key urrently arhived by Prokopius for that
identity. Finally, registration reords for already regis-
tered identities, and deregistration reords for unregis-
tered identities are disarded.
During the ertiate arhive update phase of the
round hange, Prokopius nodes partiipate in an agree-
ment protool so as to agree on how the set of traked
identities hanges, in response to newly arrived registra-
tions and deregistrations. This is done as follows:
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1. Node j puts together a traking hange sug-
gestion reord, ontaining all the valid registra-
tions and deregistrations it has reeived during
the previous round. The suggestion has the form
<Trak-Change, Aj, Dj>. Aj and Dj are the
sets of valid registrations and deregistrations respe-
tively that node j has reeived during the previous
round.
2. Node j broadasts its Trak-Change reord  this
reord need not be signed by node j  to all
Prokopius nodes. Then, it waits until it has olleted
n−f Trak-Change reords, inluding its own, from
distint Prokopius nodes. It then removes any regis-
trations or deregistrations whose signature is invalid
from every reord.
3. Eah separate appearane of eah registration or
deregistration in distint Trak-Change reords is
ounted. Node j then puts together a trak hange
proposal (A¯j , D¯j), a hange in the set of traked
identities that was suggested by at least n − 2f
Prokopius nodes. This proposal is then submitted
to the distributed agreement protool.
4. The node then waits until agreement is reahed,
yielding traking hange proposal (Aˆ, Dˆ). The
traking hange is applied to the urrent traking
set, resulting in the set of identities whose identity
ertiates will be traked for the round about to
lose.
The seond substage of this task is very similar to the
rst one. For every identity I in the set of traked iden-
tities, node j retrieves the orresponding identity erti-
ate CAI from the assoiated publi key infrastruture.
If the retrieved ertiate mathes the stored ertiate,
then no further ation is taken regarding identity I.
When it has heked all traked identities, node j puts
together an arhive update suggestion, similarly to the
traking hange suggestion desribed in step 1 above.
The rest of the proess proeeds similarly: when node j
has aumulated n−f suggestions, it ounts the number
of distint suggestions for eah ertiate update, and
then puts together an update proposal, whih it submits
to another run of the distributed agreement protool.
One the agreement protool has terminated, all nodes
insert the new ertiates into their loal arhives.
Throughout the disussion of the arhive update in this
setion, we have abstrated away the atual implemen-
tation of the ertiate arhive. Setion 5.6 details the
partiular type of Merkle tree struture we use to main-
tain snapshots of the arhive without exessive storage
wastage.
4.4.3 Linking struture update
During this step, Prokopius ats both as a Time Stamp-
ing Servie, and as a seure, write-one publiation
medium. As a TSS, Prokopius time stamps the ground-
ing values submitted to it by partiipating, traditional
TSSes, as well as the grounding value of its own iden-
tity ertiate arhive. As a publiation medium, it dis-
tributes widely the global grounding value of its own link-
ing struture, overseeing its individual nodes to prevent
them from distributing information that is inonsistent
with its urrent state.
During the previous round, Prokopius reeived from
partiipating TSSes individual grounding values. Sine
Prokopius is designed to operate at time granularities
that are muh longer than the time granularities of tra-
ditional TSSes, it guarantees no temporal preedene
among submitted grounding values within the same
round. Reall from Setion 2.1 that Prokopius an pre-
vent TSSes only from pre/post-dating douments at the
larger granularities at whih Prokopius itself operates.
Similarly to the proess desribed in the previous step,
eah node relays the TSS grounding values it has reeived
during the previous round to all other Prokopius nodes.
The set of all suh valid grounding values reeived by any
Prokopius nodes is then transformed into a linking tree
struture, as desribed in Setion 2.1.
The root of the grounding value linking struture is
then ombined with the root of the arhive struture,
as it evolved during the previous step, using a one-way
ollision-resistant funtion, yielding the Prokopius round
root. This value represents indisputably (as long as the
one-way funtion remains seure) the arhiving and time
stamping operations of Prokopius for the nishing round.
It is inserted, in turn, into the Prokopius Time Tree,
yet another linking struture, whih is also a searh tree
keyed by the round number. The new root of the time
tree is the urrent global authentiator Gi for round i of
the Prokopius system, and is the prinipal value used to
validate time stamps and arhived identity ertiates.
Sine the ontents of the grounding value struture
and those of the ertiate arhive are agreed upon by
all nodes, intermediate omputations between the deriva-
tion of the linking struture and the urrent global au-
thentiator are performed independently by eah node.
All intermediate omputations are deterministi, so or-
ret nodes should alulate the same global authentia-
tor. One a Prokopius node has omputed the global
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authentiator for this round, it signs a reord ontain-
ing it of the form <Global-Authentiator, i, Gi> and
broadasts it to all other Prokopius nodes. One a node
has reeived n − f suh reords, it ombines them in
a single reord bearing the olletive signatures of the
system (a set of signatures or a threshold signature 
see Setion 5.2), forming the master global authenti-
ator reord <Master-Global-Authentiator, i, Gi>,
whih is then widely distributed, along with the real time
assoiation for round i whih was determined during the
previous round hange (see Setion 4.4.6 below).
The master global authentiator reord is the only
value that Prokopius nodes sign olletively for publi
use, and it is only used for the duration of the following
round. This is why Prokopius is immune to the prob-
lems of aging and key hange that arise with long-term
storage of digitally signed douments. The only digital
signature that must be trusted by Prokopius lients is
derived from urrent, widely used signing keys, and is
only used for periods no longer than perhaps a month.
4.4.4 Shared random number generator update
The purpose of this step is to update the shared random
number generator of the system, in antiipation of the
impending membership hange. This ryptographi on-
strut is used to provide the randomization in the par-
tiular Byzantine agreement protools we use [CKS00℄
throughout the round hange proess.
Using the urrent shared random number generator,
Prokopius nodes derive a new random number genera-
tor for the upoming round. The update is neessary
beause group membership might hange from round to
round and the partiular shared random number gener-
ator used is dependent on the urrent membership. As
a result, urrent Prokopius members prepare the gener-
ator hange during this step, without yet knowing who
is going to remain in the group and who is not. One
the membership has been updated, in the next step, the
generator is ommitted to t it.
A side eet of the random number generator update
proess is a reord of how dierent urrent Prokopius
nodes have followed the update protool. If a node at-
tempts to heat, hoping to install a preditable shared
random number generator, for example, it will be aught
with overwhelming probability, and its heating is prov-
able to others. Suh provable naughty behavior is used
by the nodes in the following step to help weed out faulty
nodes from the system.
We desribe the partiular shared random number gen-
erator that we use and its update protool in Setion 5.5.
4.4.5 Membership update
The membership update stage of the round hange
proess is the single, most important step taken by
Prokopius to ensure its own longevity. The purpose of
this step is to identify partiipating nodes that no longer
funtion within the fundamental parameters of the sys-
tem, as outlined in Setion 4.3, or no longer funtion at
all. Furthermore, it is the purpose of this step to allow
Prokopius to refresh its ranks with new partiipants that
replae those that have been removed.
The overall operation of this step is very similar to
the traking set update stage desribed in Setion 4.4.2.
Based on joining requests reeived during the past round,
and on loally derived trust information on urrent par-
tiipants, Prokopius nodes make suggestions as to how
the system's membership should hange.
Every node evaluates properly signed joining requests
it has reeived as well as all urrent Prokopius mem-
bers. Eah node uses its own independent trust assess-
ment faility desribed in Setion 4.2, to deide whether
it has lost trust in some of its fellow nodes, and whether
it trusts the potential newomers to follow the rules as
Prokopius members.
One a omplete assessment has been made, the node
puts together a membership update suggestion, whih
it broadasts to all other nodes, and waits for others'
suggestions. Based on the suggestions it reeives, it as-
sembles a membership update proposal orroborated by
at least n− 2f urrent Prokopius members, and submits
that proposal to the distributed agreement protool. The
membership update proposal agreed upon by all mem-
bers is then applied to the urrent membership, and the
next round is ready to begin. Note that this method
of membership hange does not rely on merely observ-
able indiations of node failure, whih an be twisted by
an adversary; instead, either provable failure evidene is
used, or loal trust information that is independent of
how the protool runs. This dierentiates the Prokopius
membership hange mehanism from similar tehniques
that use failure detetors (e.g., [Rei94℄) to irumvent the
impossibility result of [FLP85℄.
Honest nodes who reeive an agreement that does not
inlude them are expeted to go away, and are ignored by
others in deliberations assoiated with the next round.
Nodes whose join was just approved request a urrent
opy of the state (the ertiate arhive and the link-
ing struture) from a urrent partiipant. Any urrent
partiipant will do, sine the state is veriable given the
urrent global grounding value.
One important point about this step is based on As-
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sumption 7. Sine no membership update should hange
the urrent membership by more than f nodes, when
suggestions are evaluated and proposals are onstruted
in the proess desribed above, the size of a proposed
membership update is always heked against this as-
sumption. This allows the system to maintain its trust
ontinuity, despite membership hanges.
To bootstrap the system for the initial round, an initial
group membership must be agreed upon through some
external means. This might be a politial agreement suh
as allowing eah interested government to inlude a node
in the system.
4.4.6 Real time derivation
In this step Prokopius determines a real time assoiation
for the next round. In so doing, Prokopius nodes guard
the proximity of their ommunal lok to the global real
lok. Assumption 6 ensures that the agreed upon om-
munal time approximates real time within a fration of
the time granularity, speially within τ/4.
This task proeeds as follows:
1. Every node signs and broadasts the loal time S at
whih it synhronized (see Setion 4.4.1), in message
<Time-Agree,i,S>. Given our lok orretness as-
sumptions, no two orret nodes' opinions on the
real time are farther apart than τ/2, disregarding
network propagation delays.
2. When a node reeives n− f valid Time-Agree mes-
sages, it determines the mean S¯ of all S values.
Then the node partiipates in an instane of the
distributed agreement protool (see Setion 5.4),
proposing the value S¯ it alulated. The node sup-
ports its proposal with a validation that onsists of
all the Time-Agree messages it used to derive its
proposal.
3. The node then waits until validated agreement on
suh a proposal Sˆ is reahed. Then, R = Sˆ + τ
is the agreed upon real time assoiation for round
i+1, and will be widely distributed, along with the
global authentiator after the linking update step of
the next round hange, as desribed in Setion 4.4.5
above.
When a node reeives Time-Agree messages from
other nodes, it has to hek their validity. Valid
Time-Agree messages have orret signatures and are
sent from urrent partiipants in Prokopius. Before a
node stops listening for further Time-Agree messages, it
heks that among the valid messages it has already re-
eived, n−f of them ontain S values that all fall within
an interval of width τ/2. If that is not the ase, the node
ontinues listening. Assumption 6 ensures that there will
eventually be n− f suh Time-Agree messages.
5 Component protools and data
strutures
In this setion we desribe the individual omponents we
use as building bloks for our time stamping servie. We
list the assumptions made by these protools and data
strutures and explain their general purpose.
5.1 Authentiated transport layer
We base ommuniations on an authentiated transport
layer, suh as that provided by Transport Layer Seurity
(TLS), whih is a minor modiation of the Seure Soket
Layer (SSL) [DA99℄. We use this protool to provide au-
thentiated ommuniation between two nodes. As long
as a node an verify the publi key ertiate sent to it by
its ounterpart (using loal ertiation authority erti-
ates, as per Assumption 4), two nodes an ommuniate
in an authentiated manner. Generally, we use only the
Message Authentiation Codes (MACs) provided by this
protool, and not signing or enryption. We only use en-
ryption during the update of the shared random number
generator (see Setion 5.5 for details).
Note that although our goal is to provide permanent
authentiated arhival of the identity ertiates in whih
the keys used by this omponent are arried, we do not
ourselves provide the assoiated publi key infrastruture
servie.
5.2 Threshold signing faility
In addition to the apabilities aorded by TLS (see
Setion 5.1), we also use standard threshold signature
shemes. Threshold signature shemes are dened within
the ontext of a well-dened group of signers. To be on-
sidered signed, a message must be individually signed by
a number of group members greater than or equal to a
preset threshold. This threshold is usually the total num-
ber of nodes minus the maximum number of expeted
misbehaving group members.
We use this faility for all of our broadast and agree-
ment protools for simpliity, even though a more e-
ient implementation might employ a distributed shared
signing faility, as seen in the protool formulations in
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[CKPS01℄. Although distributed shared signing is e-
ient to use, it generally involves an expensive re-keying
proedure when the group membership hanges. Ways to
perform suh renegotiation without resorting to a trusted
key dealer for dierent publi key ryptosystems have
been desribed [GJKR99, DK01℄, but we have not yet
explored their feasibility for large groups of nodes.
5.3 Veriable onsistent broadast fail-
ity
Our agreement protools require a veriable onsistent
broadast faility, in this ase, the eho-broadast faility
used in [Rei94℄ and reformulated for shared signatures in
[CKPS01℄. The protool is alled veriable beause after
a sender broadasts a payload to a group, that sender an
ompose a proof that a suient number of group mem-
bers has atually reeived the payload. The protool is
also onsistent, sine it ensures that any group members
reeiving the payload will reeive the same payload.
The guarantees of this protool are weaker than tra-
ditional reliable broadast protools, sine it does not
ensure that all group members reeive a broadast pay-
load; instead, it ensures that, given the maximum ex-
peted number of misbehaving group members, enough
group members reeive a broadast payload that it is
impossible for a dierent version of the same payload to
be aepted by a orret group member. Speially, if
we have n total members and an tolerate no more than
f misbehaving members, then eah broadast payload
must reah at least q =
⌈
(n+f+1)
2
⌉
nodes.
The proof of delivery for a message onsists of a set of
at least q signatures from group members on a message
reeipt.
5.4 Asynhronous multivalued Byzan-
tine agreement
The objetive of this omponent is to allow a group of
partiipants to ome to agreement on a partiular dei-
sion, even in the fae of some maliious partiipants. It
has been theoretially proven that agreement is possible
only when the maliious partiipants are fewer than a
third of all partiipants [LSP82℄, hene Assumption 1.
We use the validated Byzantine agreement proto-
ol of [CKPS01℄, whih is based on an asynhronous
binary Byzantine agreement protool [CKS00℄ derived
from the seminal randomized agreement algorithm by
[BO83℄. Randomization is neessary to solve the asyn-
hronous Byzantine agreement problem [FLP85℄. Deter-
ministi solutions based on failure detetors have been
proposed [Rei94, CL99℄, however their appliability in
our appliation domain is doubtful; deterministi failure
detetors an be subverted by a strong adversary.
Randomization is also essential in addressing the at-
tak of the aloof maliious partiipant. In this at-
tak, maliious parties partiipate in the protool but
over time inuene membership hanges to inlude more
maliious partiipants gradually. When the number of
maliious partiipants beomes large enough, Assump-
tion 1, on whih all Byzantine agreement protools rely,
beomes false, and the orretness of the protool fails.
The solution to this problem in pratial systems that
use deterministi protools [CL00℄ is proative reovery:
every one in a while, we go around and ush out all
nodes, reloading their state and software from a trusted
soure. This approah indeed helps approximate the as-
sumption that no more than a third of nodes are mali-
ious partiipants in some situations, but it only works
against external intrusion or orruption, and only in a
setting where all nodes belong to ooperating adminis-
trative organizations. When partiipating nodes belong
to independent organizations, some of whih might wish
to be maliious, suh proative reovery or software re-
juvenation measures do not work.
The randomized algorithm irumvents this problem
by using a shared distributed random number generator
that is guaranteed to be independent of what the adver-
sary wants, whenever nodes need to break a stalemate
while attempting to reah agreement.
5.5 Distributed shared random number
generator
A distributed shared random number generator allows
a group of partiipants to generate ommunally unpre-
ditable random numbers. In fat, for Prokopius we use
a threshold random number generator. Suh a genera-
tor has the property that it needs the partiipation of
at least a number of group members equal to the pre-
set threshold before the shared random number is pro-
dued. Using suh a generator with a threshold above
the maximum potential number of faulty partiipants f
ensures that the random number is not produed before
at least one orret partiipant says it is time to do so.
This means that a maliious node has to ommit to a
partiular ation in the agreement protool, without yet
knowing what that random number is going to be. It is
this feature that makes it hard for a maliious node to
inuene the outome of the agreement protools we use.
Our random number generator (sometimes alled a
oin ipping sheme) draws its seurity from the as-
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sumed intratability of alulating disrete logs in -
nite yli groups in polynomial time, and is based on
Shamir's seret sharing sheme [Sha79℄ and an idea rst
explored in [NPR99℄ that was further tted to our om-
muniations setting in [CKS00℄.
To reinitialize the generator when a membership
hange is impending, we borrow a tehnique used for
the distributed generation of seret signing keys in dis-
rete log based signing systems, originally proposed by
Pedersen [Ped91℄, but most reently amended by Gen-
naro [GJKR99℄. Gennaro's amendment strengthens the
original sheme to prevent an adversary from biasing the
distribution of the negotiated seret oin signing key. To
our knowledge, our work is the rst time this sheme has
been used to redistribute oin share signing keys in suh
a oin ipping system.
Briey, the Pedersen-Gennaro sheme makes every
group member reate a seret signing key, split it into
shares using Shamir's seret sharing [Sha79℄ sheme, and
distribute an enrypted share to eah other partiipant.
In the proess, the group member produes and publily
broadasts a set of veriation values, that an be used
by eah seret share reipient to verify the validity of its
share. The reipient of a seret share veries it using
the broadast veriation values, keeping trak of those
seret shares that did not verify aurately.
If a group member fails to verify a seret share, it a-
uses the sender of that share of fraud, and publishes the
share it reeived, along with the orresponding veria-
tion values, to prove to the entire group that the sender
heated. Suessfully hallenged heaters are exluded
from the remaining steps of the protool. In Prokopius,
proven heaters are suggested for removal from the sys-
tem by orret nodes, as disussed in Setion 4.4.5.
One all heaters have been removed, and the on-
sisteny of the new group is nalized, every partiipant
ombines the shares it reeived into a seret key, that
an be subsequently used to partiipate in distributed
random number generation. In Prokopius, this last step
is taken after the membership update stage.
5.6 Sorted-tree linking strutures
As mentioned in Setion 3.2.1, the linking struture we
use to represent together a set of douments that are
time stamped within the same time period is based on
the Merkle tree [Mer80℄. A Merkle tree is a regular k-ary
tree, whose ontents are all stored in the leaves, sorted
using a predetermined total order. Every internal tree
node is labeled by onatenating in order the labels of
its k hildren (or nil values for missing hildren) and
applying on the result a one-way, ollision-resistant hash
funtion. The label of the root is sometimes alled the
root hash of the tree. The root hash represents exatly
the ordered set of the leaves of the tree, sine to insert or
remove one of the leaves of the tree, one would have to
nd a ollision for the hash funtion. Figure 5 shows a
binary Merkle tree, where g(.) is the hash funtion, a, b,
c and d are the linked douments and w the root hash.
In fat, we use a variation of Merkle trees proposed by
Buldas et al. [BLL00℄, alled authentiated searh trees.
The authors suggest this modiation to thwart attempts
by the maintaining party to keep an inonsistent, un-
sorted tree linking struture. In these trees data oupy
not only leaf nodes, but also internal tree nodes. Fur-
thermore, the omputation of a node label takes as in-
put the searh key of the node in addition to the labels of
the node's hildren. The key property of authentiated
searh trees is that they allow lients who reeive an ex-
istene or non-existene proof from the tree maintainer
to verify that the maintainer is keeping the tree sorted.
Prokopius uses many dierent linking trees, for both
time stamp linking and ertiate arhival. We desribe
how Merkle-like trees aommodate time stamping in
Setion 3.2.1. In the ontext of arhiving, Merkle-like
trees an also be very onvenient. Like all trees, they
an be eiently versioned, so as to preserve dierent
snapshots of the set of stored data without exessive re-
dundany. Figure 8 shows an example of that. The top
tree shows the initial version (version 0) of an authen-
tiated searh tree. The middle tree shows version 1,
resulting from removing the nodes ontaining d and k
from the tree of version 0. The bottom tree is version
2, whih results from inserting nodes ontaining b and
m into the tree of version 1. The grayed out nodes are
merely referenes to the original nodes in version 0, and
need not be opied for eah subsequent snapshot, unless
they hange in ontent or label.
Note that in Figure 8, tree operations are balaned.
This is another welome property of trees that we use in
arhiving, sine it not only makes for eient tree update
operations, but also keeps existene and non-existene
proofs within the linking struture short. Balaning is
not neessary in time stamping, sine near-omplete trees
are built from srath at every round. Balaned trees in
Prokopius are red-blak trees.
In Prokopius, all tree strutures do not have the same
properties, among those desribed above. Figure 9 shows
a high-level view of all suh trees, at the end of the n-th
Prokopius round. Ai trees are linking trees put together
during round i with all time stamping grounding values
submitted by independent TSSes. Nodes are sorted by
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Figure 8: A versioned, balaned Merkle-Buldas authentiated
searh tree. Gray nodes are only referenes to the original
nodes to whih gray arrows point, and need not be opied in
subsequent snapshots of the tree unless they hange somehow.
Eah node is marked with a label/datum pair (e.g., g,G0)
and with the hashing operation that produes the label (e.g.,
h(∅, g, ∅)).
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Figure 9: The linking trees of Prokopius during round n.
Ai trees ontain grounding values. Ci trees ontain identity
ertiates. Pi nodes ombine the grounding value tree and
the ertiate tree for round i, and partiipate in the time
tree, whose root at round i is Gi.
TSS name and then by time. Suh trees are not versioned
or balaned, sine their nodes are only meaningful within
one suh Ai tree. Ci trees are ertiate arhival trees,
indiating the version of the ertiate arhive for round
i. Ci trees are versioned (so dierent Ci trees might share
ommon nodes), balaned, and their nodes are sorted by
identity name.
During round i, the root hashes of trees Ai and Ci are
ombined with a one-way ollision-resistant hash fun-
tion and are used to label the Prokopius root hash Pi
for round i. This value represents Prokopius operations
during round i. Pi nodes are stored in a balaned but
not versioned time tree. The root hash Gi of the time
tree at round i represents present and past operations
by Prokopius. Gi is signed by Prokopius nodes and dis-
tributed around the world, sine it plays the equivalent
role of a self-signed root ertiate for a Certiation
Authority. All time stamps and arhive identity er-
tiates an be veried through a sequene of existene
proofs rooted at Gi during round i. In the gure, when
Prokopius hanges into round n + 1, a new version of
the ertiate tree Cn+1 will be omputed as per Se-
tion 4.4.2, then a new linking tree An+1 will be om-
puted, as per Setion 4.4.3. Trees Cn+1 and An+1 will
be ombined into the new Prokopius value Pn+1, whih
will be inserted into the time tree, yielding a new root
hash Gn+1, whih will be signed by the new Prokopius
node membership, and distributed around the world to
replae Gn. Gn an be disarded and should be onsid-
ered useless after Gn+1 has been distributed.
6 The Narses simulator
The goal behind the Narses simulator is to simulate a
large number of nodes over very long periods of time
(on the sale of months) and with highly variable ow
sizes. We simulate ommuniation at the ow level, sine
the omputational omplexity of paket-level simulators
(suh as ns [FV99℄) is too high for our simulations to run
in reasonable time. We wanted a sheduler that ould ap-
proximate the auray of paket-based simulators with-
out the proessing time required to onsider events on a
paket level. To this end, we have attempted to build
a disrete event, ow-based simulator that elides indi-
vidual paket information but still reets the impat of
tra interdependenes. The result is a ompromise be-
tween speed and auray, but one that onsistently errs
on the side of pessimism (the simulation results report a
ow transfer time equal to or greater than what would
be onsumed in pratie.)
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Beause we make the assumption that all nodes parti-
ipating in the time stamping servie are well-onneted,
we an redue the omputational omplexity of the sim-
ulations by assuming that only the links on whih the
soure and destination nodes are attahed may limit the
bandwidth of a ow. In other words, no intermediate
links on a path from the soure to the destination other
than the rst and last hop are bottlenek links. This al-
lows us to model our network topology as a star where
every node in the network is onneted with a entral
hub node that has a diret onnetion to every edge
node. Eah edge node is assigned a bandwidth that or-
responds to an edge host's rst-link onnetion to the
Internet. Thus Narses would model a TSS onneted to
the Internet via a T-1 leased line by assigning that node
a bandwidth of 1.544Mbps.
Narses models end-to-end lateny by assigning average
latenies to eah end host. These average latenies an
be thought of as the average one way lateny from the
end host to a entral Internet bakbone network. When
two end hosts ommuniate, the end-to-end lateny is
alulated by adding the two hosts' latenies together.
The simulator is modeled after the traditional layered
network stak, but we lump the physial, link, network,
and transport layers into one layer. The overall behavior
of all of these layers ating in unison is modeled using an
algorithm we all fair ow sheduling, where we dene
a ow to be all of the bytes of a message passed from a
higher layer to the transport layer.
Fair ow sheduling alloates bandwidth to ows only
up to their fair share, even if the ow ould use more
than its fair share. The fair share bandwidth is the
bandwidth of a node divided by the number of ows
sent or reeived by that node. Where a ow moves
between two nodes of dierent bandwidth, the band-
width of the ow is determined by taking the mini-
mum of the fair share bandwidth of the soure and des-
tination of the ow. For example, if a 10Mbps node
with four urrent ows initiates a ow to a 100Mbps
node with three urrent ows, the alloated bandwidth
is min{100/(3 + 1), 10/(4 + 1)} = 2Mbps . Even though
the 100Mbps node ould devote 25Mbps to this ow, the
ow only takes up 2Mbps . In pratie this means that
some of the other ows on the 100Mbps node ould utilize
more than 1/4 of the bandwidth, but in our simulation,
we pessimistially leave them with their fair share (band-
width divided by number of ows). As ows are initiated
and ompleted, fair ow sheduling dynamially updates
the amount of bandwidth alloated to every ative ow
in the network. When enough time passes for all of the
bits of a ow to be transferred, Narses delivers the ow
to the destination node. Essentially, Narses alulates
the total transfer time for eah ow.
In addition to simulating the transfer times of ows,
Narses also simulates a loal lok for eah node in the
simulation. Doing this allows us to model lok drift ex-
periened by real distributed systems. Eah node's lok
an be ongured to drift independently, thus losely ap-
proximating a real set of independent loks. In par-
tiular, we use this funtionality to verify the parts of
Prokopius that must aount for lok drift, suh as the
synhronization protool desribed in Setion 4.4.1.
The loal node loks in Narses follow a random linear
drift pattern. Given the maximum oset between the
loal lok and real time, eah node piks a rate of oset
hange, and a new oset. It then linearly hanges its dif-
ferene from the real time until the new oset is reahed.
When the new oset is reahed, the proess is repeated.
Along with a loal lok, Narses also oers an interfae
to simulate operations that take relatively large amounts
of CPU time. We use this feature of the simulator to
model the delay inurred by performing expensive ryp-
tographi omputations, suh as generating signatures.
Thus Narses oers appliation and protool designers a
hoie between implementing a omplete system (whih
is then faster to port to a deployable system) or approx-
imating omplex funtionality, whih is easier to ode
and allows the simulations to run faster. Our omputa-
tion simulations assign to eah node a duration of a basi
ryptographi operation (a modular multipliation). All
other ryptographi operations are broken down roughly
into iterations of that basi operation.
All three of the basi node failities we desribe above,
network sheduling, lok drift sheduling and heavy
omputation sheduling, an be exibly hanged to dif-
ferent implementation without aeting the simulated
upper layers of the appliation stak.
6.1 Experiment setup
Most network simulators usually have two main aspets
of experiment setup: topology and tra pattern on-
strution. Topology onstrution reates nodes and on-
nets them with wired links, or in the ase of wireless
simulations, ongures nodes with wireless interfaes. A
network stak is also reated for eah node whih simu-
lates the protools of the network under study. After the
topology has been reated, tra is modeled by estab-
lishing a number of soures and sinks, and assigning some
kind of tra pattern or distribution to the soures.
Beause Narses abstrats away the physial topology
of the network, the topology onstrution phase is lim-
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ited to dening bandwidth and lateny harateristis of
end nodes and onstruting a stak for eah node. At
this stage, the experiment also sets up the implementa-
tion of the basi node failities  networking, lok and
omputation  whih in the experiments desribed in
this paper are fair ow sheduling, random linear drift,
and modular multipliation-based, as desribed above.
Apart from the nodes, a Narses experiment denes an
Adversary. The Adversary is the piee of logi that ex-
eutes the atual senario we are testing, in three ways.
First, the Adversary may ause nodes to perform legal
operations, for example, it may ause the arrival of a new
traking registration at one of the Prokopius nodes. Se-
ond, the Adversary may pik arbitrarily a node to sub-
vert; right now, nodes may only be aused to die in our
experiments. Third, the Adversary may ause arbitrary
network exeptions, suh as the loss or delay of a ow,
always within the limits imposed by our assumptions in
Setion 4.3.
When simulator time begins, Narses exeutes the begin
routine of the Adversary, whih an set up alarms for
further adversarial ativity, or perform bootstrapping on
the nodes. One the initialization of the adversary has
ompleted, proessing of the event queue begins. When
no more node or adversary events oupy the queue, the
simulation ends.
Although we built the Narses simulator for evaluating
the protools that omprise our time stamping servie,
we believe the simulator may be useful for evaluating
other large-sale long-running network ativities. In sep-
arate onurrent work we are evaluating the auray
and speed of Narses when ompared with paket-level
simulation. The simulations reported in Setion 7 all to-
gether took a total time of about 45 minutes running on
a dual Pentium 3 Xeon at 1 GHz per proessor and one
Gigabyte of main memory.
7 Evaluation
In this paper we seek to test whether a distributed
trusted servie using randomized Byzantine agreement
an be realisti for our appliation domain. The slow
rate-of-hange of information inherent in publi key time
stamping allows us to use methods that might otherwise
be inappropriate.
The basi building blok used during every round
hange is the Asynhronous Multivalued Byzantine
Agreement omponent, whih is invoked by members
three times to agree on the new group membership for
the following round (and by extension, on the exat se-
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Figure 10: This graph shows the inrease in the ompletion
time of the dierent phases of a single multivalued Byzantine
agreement protool instane. The lowest urve shows the pro-
posal broadast (eho) phase, The seond lowest urve shows
the additional time for the vote broadast phase. The third
urve shows the additional time to omplete a single binary
agreement. The top urve shows the total time taken by the
multivalued agreement.
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ure shared oin to be used therein), and to agree on
the real-time assoiation of a round, (the time that will
be inluded in every time stamp issued during the next
round). The agreement has several phases, namely the
eho phase, where nodes onsistently broadast their val-
idated proposal, the vote phase, where nodes broadast
their yes/no vote on a partiular proposal by a spei
node, and the agreement phase, whih is the phase dur-
ing whih nodes attempt to reah onsensus on whether
or not to use a partiular validated proposal or not.
Figure 10 presents the results of our simulations. This
graph shows the inrease in the ompletion time of the
dierent phases of a single Multivalued Byzantine Agree-
ment protool instane as the group membership size
inreases. The maximum group membership size sim-
ulated is 148 nodes. The lowest urve shows the eho
phase, whih happens exatly one per agreement. The
seond lowest urve shows the additional time taken for
the vote broadast phase, whih is muh shorter than the
proposal (eho) broadast phase, beause it does not re-
quire a onsistent broadast. The third urve shows the
additional time taken to omplete a single binary agree-
ment. The top urve shows the total time taken by the
multivalued agreement. The disrepany between the to-
tal time and the time to omplete the binary agreement
is due to the fat that the vote and binary agreement
phases may happen more than one, depending on the
proposal hosen to vote on. Sine the adversary knows in
advane in whih order the proposals are voted on, it an
shedule the orruption of the rst f proposers, ausing
the eventual agreement to delay due to repetition of the
voting and binary agreement phases.
However, the adversary annot ause more than 2f
suh repetitions [CKPS01℄. Given 148 nodes, this means
2× 49 total possible repetitions of the voting and agree-
ment phases for a single multivalue agreement. From
the graph, we see that these phases together aount for
about 510 seonds for a single repetition. Adding the 204
seonds required for the eho phase, a single multivalue
agreement may take about 14 hours. Sine three suh
multivalue agreements are required for one round, this
means the adversary an ause a time stamping round
to take about 42 hours, or almost two days.
This is indeed a worst-ase senario, for two reasons.
First, although we have not done so, the membership
agreement and real-time assoiation agreement steps of
the time stamping protool may in fat be ombined, re-
quiring only two multivalue agreements per round. Se-
ond, Cahin reports a protool with a onstant number
of expeted rounds [CKPS01℄ for multivalued agreement
whih also relies on randomization. However, we have
not yet implemented or simulated this protool.
Thus it is reasonable to state that a single round of the
time stamping protool for 148 nodes with an adversary
ausing maximal damage an still be performed in less
than a ouple of days.
8 Related work
Although time stamping seems to be essential to on-
dut seure transations with lasting eets in the digital
world of the Internet, the number of researhers explor-
ing this topi is surprisingly small. In addition to the
time stamping work desribed in Setion 2.1, most no-
tably Just [Jus98℄ desribes the intriaies of relying on
the trustworthiness of the time stamper to ensure the im-
mutability of the doument time line, and ways in whih
earlier work fails to make time stampers aountable.
This work, although not diretly appliable to the ore
time stamping desribed in this paper (where relative or-
der of publi keys within a round is insigniant), is very
important for the operation of the potential doument
time stamping servies run by the edges of our net-
work, by the group member nodes individually. A very
detailed speiation of a time stamping servie has been
produed in the TIMESEC projet [QMA
+
99℄.
Pratial systems that tolerate Byzantine faults have
been proposed and implemented in the past (e.g., [CL99,
Rei94℄). However, only deterministi approahes have
been used, due to the fat that randomization was tra-
ditionally onsidered expensive to use. To irumvent
the impossibility result of [FLP85℄, various avenues are
followed, inluding the use of failure detetors that are
very hard to build and prove orret in the ase of sys-
tems where group membership must hange, or the im-
position of a stati membership that is preongured by
the system's administrators. Unfortunately, we do not
have the luxury of knowing well in advane what the pro-
jeted membership of our system's group will be far into
the future, nor an we assume that a single administra-
tive organization an be harged with maintaining this
sheme; in fat, we most ertainly do not want a single
organization to perform this task all by itself. It seems
that in suh a setting, where we an use neither proative
reovery [CL00℄, nor a stati group membership, random-
ization is the only way to go. Fortunately, the timing re-
quirements of our appliation are lax enough that we an
employ the more expensive randomized agreement teh-
niques desribed here without signiant servie quality
redution. Reently, Cahin [Ca01℄ desribed an arhi-
teture for seure and fault-tolerant servie repliation on
21
the Internet using the basi omponents we use in this
work, although the work relies on the group membership
being stati.
Other researhers have explored tehniques for ex-
trating out detail and hene reduing omputation
omplexity for simulations of large-sale networks.
Flowsim [ADET93℄ abstrats away some of the detail of
paket-level simulators by grouping pakets with losely
spaed send times together into a single event alled a
paket train. This is motivated by the observation that
links on real networks are frequently oupied solely by
pakets from the same ow.
In addition, [HEH98℄ develops two abstrations for
simulating large sale multiast networks. The rst
abstration is to eliminate maintenane messages that
maintain the multiast tree. The seond abstration, and
the one most related to our work, is that they do away
with hop-by-hop routing and instead shedule paket de-
livery diretly from soure to destination. The key dier-
ene is that they do not take queuing delay into aount,
whih means that ross tra does not aet the trans-
mission of pakets. We take into aount queuing delay
by dividing up bandwidth between onurrent ows in
or out of the same node. However, we also ignore ross
tra that is unrelated to Prokopius, and pretend there
is no other servie running in the world.
9 Future work
There are several avenues of future work for us. Some
obvious areas are proof of orretness of the protools,
further validation of the Narses simulator, and evaluation
of a reasonably-sized deployment of Prokopius.
While Prokopius is merely a TSS for publi key in-
formation, as desribed in Setion 2.1 it is trivial to ex-
tend it to an arbitrary doument time stamping servie.
In this sense, Prokopius beomes the seure publiation
medium for loally provided time stamping servies that
an lie at the edge of the network. We plan to extend
Prokopius in this way, sine we require a doument TSS
for the following projet.
Prokopius is but one omponent of a larger projet fo-
used on providing histories of online names. An online
name might be an email address, instant messaging iden-
tier, or perhaps even a telephone number. It is likely
to be an identier that works over several appliations or
online media. Suh names are useful for several purposes,
inluding ontating people or assigning identities to on-
line ontrats. While there are several projets and om-
panies that aim to provide unique online identiers for
people ([RKJ00, MB00℄ or www.onename.om), we reog-
nize that people's online names are likely to hange due
to hanges in employment or geographial address or be-
ause the ompanies hosting the online names go out of
business or themselves hange names. Knowing an old
online name for a person is thus no help in reahing that
person if there is no way to nd the new name from the
old one.
Assuming anyone wishes to do so, our naming history
servie allows people to provide an authentiated his-
tory of their online names, whih is a list of signed map-
pings between eah name and the next most reent name.
When given an old name (and approximate time frame
during whih that name was valid), the history servie
returns the newest online identier for that person. The
history servie is an example of authentiated arhived
information. Mappings between an old name and a newer
name in the servie may be authentiated using a publi
key that is no longer valid. The time stamping servie is
thus an essential omponent that allows us to validate the
authentiation of eah link in a person's naming history,
and we would like to nish building the history servie
and evaluate Prokopius in that ontext.
10 Conlusion
In this paper we show that it is possible to build seure
reliable and survivable servies in a peer-to-peer network
using Byzantine fault-tolerant protools. Prokopius is
able to oer publi key time stamping rounds on the or-
der of a ouple of days for a 148-node network even in the
ase where an adversary auses the maximum damage al-
lowed within our fault model. Rounds on the order of a
ouple of days, or even on the order of a week, are suf-
ient to support appliations, suh as arhival of pub-
li key snapshots, where the information itself hanges
slowly.
In ontrast to a entralized time stamping servie, the
distributed servie an survive hanges in publi keys and
even a omplete hange in servie provider membership
over time. The servie an validate douments signed in
the past with keys no longer in servie and by entities
that have eased to exist.
This publi key time stamping servie an also form
the ore of a time stamping servie for other kinds of
douments, also built in a peer-to-peer network. In this
ase, individual nodes in the network may time stamp the
douments submitted to them without onsultation with
other nodes, and thus with only loal overhead for eah
time stamp. Every one in a while, these nodes submit
22
the round hashes of their individual time stamping eorts
to the group for agreement.
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